

Rethinking social enterprise through philanthropic and democratic solidarities

Jean-Louis Laville¹ and Philippe Eynaud²

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in THEORY OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND PLURALISM: Social Movements, Solidarity Economy, and Global South on May 2019, available online: <https://www.routledge.com/Theory-of-Social-Enterprise-and-Pluralism-Social-Movements-Solidarity/Eynaud-Laville-dos-Santos-Banerjee-Avelino-Hulgard/p/book/9780367260408>

To cite this paper:

Laville J.L., Eynaud P., 2019, “Rethinking social enterprise through philanthropic and democratic solidarities”, in Eynaud P., Laville J.L., Dos Santos L.L., Banerjee S., Hulgard H., Avelino F. (2019), *Theory of social enterprise and pluralism: Social Movements, Solidarity Economy, and Global South*, Routledge Publisher, Oxfordshire, June, pages 18-43.

Introduction

The discourses about the end of history, very diffuse at the end of the 20th century, wanted to promote the idea of a congruence between market capitalism and democracy. But, obviously, In the beginning of the 21st century, there is still a recurrent tension between capitalism and democracy. To address this issue, two answers claim their quest for more solidarity.

The first one is dominant and supported by important actors of the contemporary capitalism. It is related with private initiatives in a liberal economic context, and the discourse about solidarity and humanism is intertwined with competitiveness and competition. In the wake of charismatic social entrepreneurs, the new venture is philanthropic. Within this perspective, social action is related to voluntary giving, corporate social responsibility, and benefit corporations. Its assumption is that we do not need to change our economic pattern but to support the activities of social enterprises and social entrepreneurs. In this first option, solidarity is philanthropic.

The second answer is related to the ideas of associationist authors and the actors of the French revolution of 1848. It assumes that the civil rights have to be strengthened by social citizenship. It connects and recombines social movements, citizen initiatives and solidarity economy. By reinventing and enriching the models of democracy, this form of solidarity aims to renew public action, to transform the vision of economy and to improve social and democratic innovation. Instead of merely juxtaposing social and economy, the goal of this second answer is to find a way to reconcile them (See chapter 7). In this second option, solidarity is democratic.

According to us, one of the main problem for deepening the knowledge about social enterprise is the frequent confusion between the two forms of solidarities: democratic and philanthropic ones. To avoid this, we definitely need to make a detour through history. Thus, the first part of this chapter comes back to the international forgotten history of solidarity. Solidarity is indeed a key concept to emphasize that solidarity experiences cannot be identified only to welfare capitalism. Solidarity was actually invented before the social State and was not reduced to the social domain. This retrospective enlightens the contradictory come backs of a citizen based associationism and of a plutocratic tendency weakening democracy detailed in the second part. The controversy at the present time, after the puffing of welfare states, prepares a prospective presented in the third part. The past of solidarity allows to see better the possibilities of its future with the open perspective for redesigning the concept of social enterprise.

¹ Professor at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (Cnam, Paris), head of the Chair of Solidarity Economy

² Professor at Sorbonne Business School, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne

1. Solidarity, an history revisited

During the 19th century, a new form of solidarity was invented as a force for social integration, opposing the influence of money and administrative power, according to Habermas, administrative power. The philosophers who introduce this concept insist on the primacy of symbolic exchange over economic exchange while rejecting any return to the former social order based on inherited affiliations. Although the barriers of hierarchical society have been broken down, the use of the term solidarity reflects a form of uncertainty concerning social cohesion, especially as it denotes the renouncing of a sense of security based on religious dogma. The progressive emancipation from tradition leads to an awareness that the main source of sense is meaningful activity. However, the latter cannot be reduced to rational action any more than motives for action can be solely attributed to material interest. In the modern sense of the term, solidarity, according to Mauss, subjects the gift, “one of the human rocks on which societies are built” (Mauss, 2001, p. 148) to a secularization process; it does not only refer to traditional community relationships “determined by the nature”, it includes voluntary involvement where “men become fully conscious of the bonds that unite them” and operate “planned, deliberate, active solidarity” as emphasized by Servet (2006, p. 448). This relationship is distinct from both charity and instrumental relationships, and it should be understood as an acknowledged interdependence between people and groups³.

This interdependence reframes the relationships between human beings and with the natural environment as Polanyi (1977) argues by growing on a large body of anthropological research. Human societies refer in this matter to different principles. In addition to the market, there is the reciprocity resulting from the presence of symmetrically situated groups, redistribution whereby a central authority organizes the allocation of resources, and householding which specifies the rules for each closed group, guaranteeing the production and sharing of resources in order to satisfy its members. The form of solidarity made possible by democratic revolutions is therefore in no way traditional and goes beyond householding to reorganize reciprocity and redistribution. It introduces the idea of egalitarian reciprocity experienced through direct interaction between citizens. The rise of democracy in the 19th century, “the age of revolutions” (Hobsbawm, 1962), led to the invention of a new solidarity. It long preceded the invention of the social domain and the “age of capital and empire” (Hobsbawm, 1975, 1987). If we reintroduce often ignored debates from the 19th century into our analysis, it becomes clear that the hope of achieving equality gives rise to struggles for political reform and revolts against economic subjection. Groups that are denied their dignity as citizens, or are victims of exploitation, rebel against the exclusion and disdain that they are subjected to.

Regarding this, as suggested by Fraser (1997), the themes addressed in popular spheres are different from those treated in the bourgeois sphere, since they include economic issues in the public debate. According to Faure and Rancière (2007, p. 32), “the workers’ voice”, by drawing attention to the “issue of power on the shop floor, is by no means a hijacking of political action by workers”. It expresses a desire for dignity for all that is centered on resistance and work demands embodying the power of collective autonomy. The contradiction between the assertion of equality and the persistence of inequalities leads to a denunciation of the incompatibility between political freedom and economic subjugation. The solidarity referred to when calling for the further opening up of the public sphere can also be invoked to organize the economy on a more egalitarian basis.

Democratic solidarity in practices

Solidarity defined as a means to reinforce the political principals of liberty and equality in daily lives is linked to associationism, which is, a project built on collective actions carried out by free

3

and equal citizens in reference to a common good. Three variants of this general approach could be observed in social practices. The first two variants highlight the complex relationships between democratic change and economic autonomy. One comes from actors who believed in the power of self-help assistance and, thanks to an associative movement marked by mutuality, used this power base to redesign the economic structures that resulted from inherited communities. The other relates to the collective actions of people excluded from citizenship. In order to facilitate their access to civil rights, they joined forces to organize socially useful economic activities. These two distinct types of emancipation movement are illustrated by examples from South and North America. The third variant of these associative actions can be found in Europe but also in North America. It allows us to capture the emergence of demands for greater acknowledgement of associations, including their economic dimension. These demands came from workers who refused to have their new freedom jeopardized by their subjection to capital and who were calling for policies recognizing their growing cooperative practices.

- In the first half of the 19th century, anti-colonialist social movements escalated in Latin America; they succeeded in gaining independence and in establishing national republics, Brazil being the only country to remain under imperial rule. National independence led to widespread changes in the socio-economic order. While the popular economy in its diverse forms remained (Santana Junior, 2005), its internal structure was modified. The popular economy is a product of places and historical circumstances at a particular point in time but also develops from the everyday behavior of its actors, and eventually through the political vision they may acquire (Sarria Icaza, Tiriba, 2006). What was at stake was the reduction of states of dependence and the democratization of the popular economy. This meant applying economic logics to serve social ends, while at the same time giving them a new democratic coherence. Despite its harshness, the popular economy could also be a source of dignity by allowing individuals to find collective solutions to their food, housing and health problems. This was the conviction of those who, under the influence of the new democratic political climate, modified large parts of the popular economy. The growing demand for equality which motivated and guided their actions transformed the latter into essential means of resistance against the increasing penetration of capitalism (Mingione, 1991). Hoping to emancipate themselves from traditional forms of dependence, they also rejected forms of subordination related to an economic order controlled by capital.
- The form of associative organization mobilized in South America to change the popular economy was also used in North America to demand civil rights. Although conditions of life and of popular economies were affected by democratic victories, the protests against sexual and racial inequality in the developing United States of America did not disregard economic pathways. They used the latter to gain legitimacy and, in doing so, avoided an outright refusal of their civil rights demands. In this perspective, the link between politics and economy, absent from the white male population's world, becomes apparent when looking at associations set up by African-Americans and women. African-Americans, most of whom were still slaves, succeeded in building their own institutions: these were small mutual aid groups promoting self-organization and civic virtue. Although modest, they were present enough to ensure that their demands in favor of abolition could no longer be ignored. They were supported by independent churches that were used to raise funds which were then invested in the African-American community. For example, in the middle of the 1820s, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, founded by Allen in 1816, had more than a thousand members. The church did not only support its destitute or needy members, but also provided a starter capital to help small entrepreneurs. It became a seat of protest, providing African-Americans with increased confidence in their mobilizing capacity and their collective strength, as demonstrated by written petitions. It shows how African-American churches were transformed into places to fight against continuing discrimination through the publication of newspapers and the setting up of national

antiracist conventions (Brooks-Higginbotham, 1990). Promoting a progressive and pacific vision of social change, they challenged the idea of armed struggle and sought a peaceful political solution to injustice. Almost a century later, Du Bois concluded that this church was one of the greatest Black organizations in the world (McCarthy, 2003, p. 1), where religious activities were constantly imbricated with political expression. As far as women were concerned, they were kept away from the public sphere through an established separation between the domestic and political domains, reinforced by customary law. The increasing number of assemblies in the years from 1830 to 1840 encouraged an increase in participation but, as Ryan (1992, p.259-288; 1990) resumes the cacophonous style of politics that was practiced there, combining debate with insults and punches, all washed down with alcohol and laughter, perpetuated a male chauvinism that rejected the “effeminate”. With the civil war came opportunities to provide supplies for troops and then, beyond the 1860s, the responsibility of caring for the poor and dependent classes. By “creating institutions that provided education, vocational training and moral guidance to the poor, women volunteers constructed a private system of public welfare”. They were less reluctant than men to seek government funding, even soliciting help from local councils and public authorities for this purpose. Progressively, they gained a reputation as “effective administrators of public services” and also influenced policies through a variety of means: public meetings, petitions, lobbying... Alleviating suffering and helping the most destitute were actions that were recognized as being useful to the community. The professed motives, often religious, helped to make meetings, which would otherwise have been condemned by the conservatives, more acceptable. However, behind this apparent social conformism loomed a more dissenting protest movement. Participants were no longer isolated, they identified with these collective organizations that reinforced their self-esteem through personal empowerment and self-determination⁴. Economic action facilitated the emergence of political consciousness because the people concerned were committed to finding solutions to their problems.

- While the French Revolution was breaking out, the 1790s also saw a kind of “English Revolution” (Thompson, 1966). The labor movement was mainly composed of home workers and in many towns of “shoemakers, weavers, saddlers and harnessmakers, booksellers, printers, building workers, small tradesmen, and the like”. Radical London emerged “from the host of smaller trades and occupations” rather than “heavy industry”. In fact, “the factory hands, far from being the eldest children of the industrial revolution were late arrivals” (Thomson, op., cit., p. 193). The production sites, although varied in nature, were places where political views were discussed. As stated by Thelwall, each one was “a sort of political society which no act of parliament could silence and no magistrate disperse (Thelwall, 1796, I, p. 21 to 24, cited by Thompson, op. cit., p. 185). Workers, craftsmen, and radical laborers kept up their own traditions, while at the same time establishing links with the illegal Jacobin and trade union movements. Their main inspiration came from a belief in the transforming power of reason and the “Socratic spirit”, in the capacity for self-improvement of every individual. Equality was the benchmark which made any distinction of status unacceptable. This demand was born out of shared experiences which constituted the basis for collectivist conceptions of society, in opposition to the bourgeoisie’s individualist conceptions. This can be seen through the varied language of philanthropic societies which made haphazard references to Christianity, fraternity and “*social man*”.

Indeed, during this period, philanthropy was indissociable from the dominated class’s quest for freedom. It contributed to the establishment of the typical way of functioning of independent workers’ organizations. In contrast to church assistance, emphasis was placed on the acceptance

⁴ These groups continued in various forms. Regarding the end of the 19th century, see Clemens, 1993. For the contemporary period, see Evans, 1980

of self-discipline and the observance of rituals showing a sense of common belonging through outings, evening events and celebrations. Codes of conduct and rules, established away from the watchful eye of the authorities, resulted in new forms of sociability based on self-respect and political awareness. Friendly societies were emblematic of this self-organization and practical ethic: they brought about the creation of trade unions, sheltered them, helped them to become federations and trained their leaders, while also providing cover for clerical workers, small traders and factory workers against illness, unemployment and death-related expenses (Petitclerc, 2007). In 1773, date of the first law, they were estimated to have 648 000 members, which had increased to 925 000 by 1815. In France, demands that had previously remained underground were brought to light by the 1848 revolutions. In February and March, a number of decisions were quickly made regarding the right to work, the abolition of the death penalty and slavery, the freedom of the press, of assembly and of association. The term "association" refers to "a large diversity of collectivities: former guilds became mutual aid societies or resistance, solidarity, mutual credit or simply fraternal societies, whose immediate objective was to fight against the most glaring inequalities and the most hated forms of exploitation". Sewell describes the effervescence among groups of workers who, along with bourgeois democrats, became involved in the life of hundreds of political clubs that had suddenly sprung up in Paris and in the provinces after the February Revolution: clubs that reflected republican thinking in all its nuances. Some founded their own newspapers, many others contributed to a wide variety of republican publications. Most importantly, they would reform and breathe new life into their professional associations (Sewell, 1980). "Les compagnonnages" or French guilds, placement and mutual assistance organizations, were secularized and became associations where workers were no longer subject to a hierarchy but determined their own governance. The mutual aid societies that evolved from guilds developed in a similar way to those in England; they provided unemployed or striking workers with help. These instruments of combat laid the groundwork for trade unions, with their mix of corporatism, mutualism and republicanism.

Although England and France are emblematic examples, others can be cited, such as USA. The work of Blin (2017) explores the history of cooperative businesses in the state of Wisconsin between the 1870s and the 1930s. Her research reveals that "Although cooperators did not succeed in creating a "movement" or an economic "system" that would serve as an alternative for an industrial capitalism dominated by big corporations, they were able to build a specific and more democratic form of business enterprise, whose model was easy to identify at the end of the 1930s." The influence of cooperatives has been strong through three important reform movements in U.S. history: the antimonomopolist struggles of the Gilded Age, the Progressive era and the New Deal. Blin shows that cooperatives were "continuously part of the American reform horizon in those decades".

Another example can be found in Spain, where the 1836 legislation against guilds did not prevent the rapid development of structures created by the nascent labor movement and with their roots in the trades. In this way, mutual aid societies came into being in 1841, numbering 664 in 1887 and 1271 in 1904, and counting 238 351 members. They were combined with other forms of advocacy to generate multidimensional associative expressions. However, this combination of political and economic levels, which constitutes the specificity of associations in this first phase, has been particularly neglected. This omission, which has become so widespread that it is no longer questioned, can be explained by the confusion between pioneering associations and the messages of authors identified as utopians. Although associationism has been inspired by utopians, it does not share their prophecies. Casting aside prophecies, the irreducible specificity of associationism is that it addresses democracy-related issues. Workers that commit to these doctrines are disseminators of, as well as dissenters from, the latter; they adapt them through debate to turn them into economic and political reforms that they put to the test in practice. Far from the utopias that have been written about in the past, the time has come for practiced utopias. Solidarity-based associationism introduces a new approach to utopia. Instead of the dream of a

reconciled society, it supports the desire for change by two related means: though social experimentation and the reorientation of public policies.

From a solidarity to another

The above form of solidarity implementation was embedded in democratic dynamics. With the second 19th century, a productivist ideology is more and more influential, naturalizing capitalism as the modern economy legitimized by the hope of wealth for everybody. The ideology of progress relates the improvement of living standards and conditions to the acceleration of industrial growth. The debate about forms of economy based on solidarity weaken and, over the course of the 19th century, two understandings of the concept of solidarity could be clearly distinguished. The first form was democratic solidarity. Based on mutual aid as well as on the expression of demands, it stemmed from both self-organization and the social movement, which presupposed equal rights among the people committed to it. On the basis of free access to the public sphere for all citizens, it strived to strengthen political democracy through economic and social democracy. In opposition to this approach to solidarity as a principle of democratization resulting from collective action, another approach was progressively put forward, replacing notions of equality with those of benevolence and solicitude. This second form of solidarity was philanthropic solidarity. In opposition of the first claim to philanthropy as a humanist approach, when philanthropic solidarity contrasted with democratic one (Duprat, 1993), it began to reflect the vision of an ethical society where citizens motivated by altruism voluntarily fulfill their duties toward one another. It acted as an essential means of prevention that legitimized the use of punishment when attempts at moralization were unsuccessful. According to Bastiat, who was in agreement with Malthus and Ricardo, solidarity was the result of a collection of individual responsibilities and owed its effectiveness to its voluntary nature. The philanthropic approach to solidarity was based on this individualistic conception. It promoted the creation of mutual aid societies provided that they could educate the most deserving workers to plan and save, and reward them according to their merits. Associations were only acceptable for bringing together individuals to develop their sense of responsibility, but became condemnable when they turned into a force for social change. This is why they had to be placed under the control of social elites who could safeguard them against misuse for subversive purposes.

The institution of capitalism⁵ was the result of continual efforts to identify and extend the market economy sphere, and was achieved through a series of moves and decisions concerning the definition of the economy. This process of selection and formatting was based on the presentation of the market economy and capitalist enterprise as the pinnacle of progress. What had been forgotten is that this progress was partly due to the annexation of economic resources taken at the expense of southern countries, followed by the annexation⁶ of a popular economy. In South America, more than free market, a series of regulations prevailed that were designed to benefit an “industry imposed from the top-down”. Faced with the precarity of their members’ living conditions and the emergence of a proletarian class from capitalist industries, popular movements became more radical in their stances. The leaders of mutualism and *labradores* organizations rallied around a modernization plan which was meant to solve social problems through industrial development. In order to do so, they abandoned the institutions they had created to devote themselves more exclusively to protest action demanding state intervention and their participation in national negotiations as workers’ representatives⁷.

Since Mariategui’s seminal work (Mariategui, 1979), Western Marxism has been accused of having contributed to a pessimism that led to the demise of the popular economy. Quijano’s

⁵ In the sense where it is a domination of people’s thoughts, in the words of Castoriadis, 1975, p. 218-224.

⁶ According to Lutz, 1990, these two “annexations” are similar in many ways

⁷ *Ibid.* chap 2. The expressions “*productive social fabric*” and “*industry imposed from the top-down*” are borrowed from Nyssens

deconstruction of “coloniality” takes up this criticism, arguing that the productivist ideology underlies both liberalism and historical materialism and, according to him, constitutes “the most Eurocentric version of Marx’s heritage”, a result of the “hybridization of his theoretical propositions with evolutionism and positivist dualism along with the Hegelian idea of a historical macro-subject” (Quijano, 2007, p.160). The consequences have been very damaging: the division of social activities has been pushed as far as the reification of categories such as economy, society, culture and politics; private ownership and exploitation have been absolutized as if they alone embody oppression. The unicity of the capitalist mode of production was accepted, whereas in reality it constituted more an “articulation of all other modes of production” (Quijano, op. cit., p.159; see also Quijano, 1998). From the moment that the belief in a capitalist system replaced the analysis of a “predominantly capitalist system” to quote Mauss (1997), the alternative economies, although present in Latin America, became invisible. The denial of the role and the history of popular practices went hand in hand with severe repression by governments. With regard to North America, Zinn used the expression “*civil war*” to refer to the conflict opposing national authorities and associations demanding greater democracy. The material and symbolic destructuring of the moral economy made the project to moralize the poor conceivable. The strategy was to abandon demands for equal rights to replace it by a fight against poverty.

The actions of women organizations saw their political aspirations stifled by the “*chivalrous*” protection and benevolence of the male elites. This process of normalization involved either a direct taking of control by men or a paternalism offering protection to middle class white women as long as they complied with the behaviors which men considered appropriate to their gender. Although the organizations run by these women were weakened by male pressure, the situation of African-American women was much worse. Victims of open hostility, they had to fight with their limited resources for education and assistance, as well as for the assertion of their identity. Ryan, who studied attempts to extend public spaces to benefit the women who figured notes that the services and advice provided by feminist organizations in the United States remained in the condescending hands of “protestant matrons” looking after their “worthy poor” (Ryan, 1992, p.279-280). The 1830s and 1840s were among the most violent decades of American history. Murders and atrocities, coupled with the infiltration of movements and the violation of freedoms, sometimes led to their radicalization, as was the case for a part of the black movement that opted for civil disobedience, with well-known figures of the activism like Douglass (About Douglass, former slave, see *ibid.*, p. 163-193 ; Mc Carthy, *op. cit.*, p. 161-164).

In the writings of Hammonds, the expression “*civil war*” is used in relation to 19th century England. Aiming for a productive system based on mutualism as an alternative to capitalism, the working class defended itself without managing to bridge the differences between skilled workers undergoing reclassification and unskilled workers, nor managing to form an alliance with the bourgeoisie whose inegalitarian ideology was reinforced by the fear of revolution. The separation between these two universes was recorded in the 1832 electoral franchise, and the force of the counter-revolution isolated a movement toward equality which remained a workers’ movement for which the right to vote was a step toward respect and equity at work. Given these conditions, popular radicalism was revived on a number of occasions. In 1811, Luddism appeared; its attempts to destroy machines were a manifestation of the revolt against the advent of the industrial system and “*laissez-faire*” policies. According to Hobsbawm, this “negotiation by riot”, rather than being a rejection of technical progress, was a struggle against unemployment and for the conservation of standards of living, “which included nonmonetary factors such as freedom and dignity” (Chevassus-Au-Louis, 2006, in particular chap. 10, “*Historiographical rehabilitation*” which frequently refers to Hobsbawm, 2005). Later, protest journalism and trade unionism spread, followed by the 10-hour-day movement, the 1831 revolutionary crisis and various movements leading to Chartism. This activity was sustained until the end of the 19th century, but then trailed off to make way for a socialism which shifted emphasis from political to economic rights (Thompson, 1971). The cross-cutting nature of actions that were both political

and economic was progressively lost over time in a general shift toward a distinction between different forms of social action.

As in Spain, social action could rely on the return of charity but it was above all a form of philanthropy that aimed to replace democratic solidarity. With regard to France, the momentum of 1848 was broken by the repression of June and July. In this context, the philanthropic project was redefined. Before, philanthropy was linked to “the image of this great fraternal and messianic people, stronger through its virtue than through its arms”, providing a model of “universal exchange of care and mutual aid, a virtue supposedly shared by all citizens”, an “insidious regression” is occurring with “calls from public authorities for the charity of the social elites” (Duprat, 1993, p. 478). This backward step was obvious because the prevention of disorder took precedence over concern for humanity. Philanthropy became synonymous with the moralization of the poor, which had become a priority and led to the search for a means of ensuring adequate guidance. As Cherbuliez commented in 1853, when seeking to find a solution to the causes of poverty, it is “in the direct personal action of man over man, or in other words through patronage, that a solution to the problem should be looked for” (de Bry, 2006). The “*social economy*” that Pecqueur (1839) could see developing with solidarity associationism, progressively turned into patronage with Le Play defined as follows: “the set of ideas, mores and institutions that keep many families together as a group, to their complete satisfaction, under the supervision of a leader appointed as Patron” (*Ibid*, p. 79). According to these authors, rather than generalized philanthropy fueling poverty, a more targeted, selective and austere form of philanthropy needed to be promoted. This view continued until the end of the 19th century in the form of corporate paternalism. Considered as a cure worse than the disease, any form of compulsory legal solidarity was to be energetically opposed.

However, despite all the advantages philanthropic solidarity benefited from, social problems remained unresolved. Their threat to social stability made the philanthropic solution untenable as it attributed inequalities of condition solely to individual responsibility. At the end of the 19th century, the philanthropic approach had been largely left behind. Associations contributed to this and, despite action taken against them, some remained democratic actors, establishing themselves as the crucibles of left wing parties and trade unions.

2. From welfare states to multi-dimensional crisis

It is obvious that at the end of the 19th century an economic sophism, to use Polanyi's terms, has settled a confusion between modern economy and market capitalism. The result was a denial of the importance of a moral economy (The notion of moral economy was introduced by Thompson in studies of workers and extended to peasants by Scott, 1976) based on notions of common well-being, reciprocal obligations and shared conceptions of rights and obligations. All these notions that were grounded in the concrete spaces of intersubjectivity of the popular economy, whether applied to workers or peasants, gradually disappeared behind the performativity of a linear approach to history. This is the trap that Braudel warned against, that of only seeing the market economy, of “describing it with such a wealth of detail as to imply an all-pervasive presence, when it is just a piece of a larger whole”(Braudel, 1985, p. 45). As Polanyi noted, this interpretation was incorrect, but was a sign of things to come (Polanyi, 1977). Economic reality was created through the development of an economic belief presented as an unbiased observation. From this perspective, the market capitalism stage was unavoidable.

The age of welfare states

At the same time, ongoing threats to civil peace made the philanthropic solution untenable; inequalities in the human condition could not be attributed to the responsibility of the individual, and by the end of the 19th century, the fundamental limits of philanthropic solidarity had become

apparent. Democratic solidarity regained the upper hand when sociological inquiry opposed economic liberalism and reaffirmed the concern for social cohesion. The holistic vision of society as more than the sum of the individuals composing it critiqued an approach to solidarity confined to the private sphere; it stressed the public dimension of solidarity, centered on rights. However, this form of democratic solidarity differed from earlier versions. Faith in associations was replaced by a control of the market by public authorities. The state promoted a specific social mode of organization, which made it possible to extend the market economy while making it compatible with the citizenship of workers. The divides caused by the market economy had to be corrected through policy and legal interventions – hence, the conception of social rights combining workers’ rights within the enterprise with social protection aiming to protect the workers against specific risks. The social question led to the separation of the economic (specifically, the market economy) and the social (i.e. a legal mode of protection of society). Such a compromise, based on the partition and complementarity of the market and the social state, was progressively reinforced. After the Second World War, when it proved necessary to support national consensus, this complementarity between the state and the market gained its full significance. The development model that was stabilized in 20th century Europe was based on the synergy between the market and the state, which had the effect of crowding out various forms of associative activity. The Keynesian state aimed to enhance economic development through the use of new tools of knowledge and intervention. Public investment in sectors deemed particularly viable, and labour market policy aimed at working conditions and wages, made it possible to find stable ways to accommodate the particular interests of enterprises alongside the general interest of society. But the main shift was in income redistribution, through which the social state became the so-called ‘welfare state’: the setting up of the latter aimed to fulfill the promise to protect citizens from illness, accidents, old age and unemployment. The generalization of social protection had to ensure security for a population that had endured the depression of the 1930s and the sacrifices of two world wars. The welfare state extended the previous forms of social state with social security and the generalization of social protection systems. The state framed and supported the market as much as it corrected market inequalities. The synergy between the state and the market was expressed, in particular, through new institutional arrangements, including social security and collective bargaining, as well gains in productivity. So, without entering in the well-known discussion about the worlds of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the principle of welfare seems to be ambivalent: on the one hand, it reintroduces a strong reference to democratic solidarity, based on rights and not benevolence, but on the other hand it only locates it in state redistribution dependent on the results of market capitalism.

The three decades of post-war growth were marked by the establishment of a socio-economic compromise symbolized by the 1945 Declaration of Philadelphia, which affirmed that economic development was only worthwhile if it served social development. In other words, the role of government was accepted in the form of Keynesian interventionism and the Welfare State, both intended to prevent the return of the disorders that had led to the Second World War. A first cultural crisis which started in the late 1960s manifested the exhaustion of this compromise, with new social movements such as ecology or feminism challenging the assimilation between economic growth and improvement of living conditions as the modes of action of the traditional social state impregnated with patriarchal norms.

The critics coming from the new social movements

After the age of welfare states, new social movements identified the democratic deficits of a statist approach of solidarity. In the wake of economic crisis, critics are made and alternative economic practices are experimented (Castells, Caraça, Cardoso, 2012). The socio-economic compromise described above underwent a cultural crisis in the 1970s with the rise of experiments in both self-management and new social movements, which unsettled the culture underlying the synergy between the market and the state.

Conflicts in enterprises no longer merely concerned collective negotiation, centered on the distribution of the value added. Contestation also emerged around the modes of organization and the lack of opportunities for salaried workers to express themselves. More importantly, the nature of contestation could no longer be reduced to the clash between capital and labour; it extended to consumption and ways of life. Although the rallying cries of the new social movements remained disparate, anti-nuclear, environmental and feminist protests articulated and popularized new questions around the social and environmental costs of "progress" and commodification. Standards and aspirations imposed during the post-war growth period were no longer self-evident. Claims for a better quality of life emerged. What was questioned was the very basis of the development model, which hitherto had enjoyed a broad consensus. The ideology of progress was seriously questioned, as was the future of economic society (i.e. a society shaped by the struggle against scarcity and by productivism) more broadly. The workers' movement was marked by a tradition of economic determinism from the 2nd International. In reaction, the new movements have been considered as focused on the questions of identities and rights.

These questions led to changes in forms of political activism. Most of the interpretations argued for a cultural turn of the social movements. If some alternative economic practices are raising, the process of emergence is long. The process of experimentation can be described in an open-ended one. The sharing "of the learning process induces new forms of living that were not originally intended, but ultimately discovered". In a deliberate way, "people do not move towards a programmed goal. They discover their goals, and themselves, in the process of learning by doing" (Castells, Caraça, Cardoso, 2012; p. 230). The promotion of "a more horizontal and networked movement as well as the valorization of personal autonomy have favoured greater detachment of activists from civil society organizations" (Pleyers, 2010; p. 235).

With the devastating effects of the economic crisis, the capacity of new social movements to attract and to aggregate society demands declined. But if the movements of the 1960's have fragmented, the questions they raised remain open and other democratic dynamics have reasserted themselves. The new spirit of democratic solidarity stays present facing the new spirit of capitalism, but its forms of expression have changed. As it was mentioned by Eisenstein (Eisenstein, 2005) and Fraser (2009) about feminism, the cultural turn of social movements when it has led to a surrender of social critique replaced by an artistic critique focused on identities has generated a "dangerous liaison" with corporate globalization. Pleyers and Capitaine (2016, p. 8 - 12) add that "the distinction established in the decades 1970 and 1980, between classical movements, centered on mass organizations and demands of redistribution, and "new social movements" mobilized around questions of recognition is no more relevant. In this context, the new social movements are weakened leaving space for another critic of welfare state.

Second wave of neoliberalism and the return of philanthropy

But these grass-roots initiatives have been crossed by a neoliberalism integrating explicitly the social problems and suggesting its methods for diminishing poverty. The debate about solidarity initiated for the 21st century strangely evokes the one held during the 19th century: democracy or philanthropy. The growing inequalities give new spaces to plutocrats fighting with citizens' multidimensional commitments. The protests that resulted were seen by the established powers as factors of social troubles which could render society uncontrollable. This fear of a destabilization of the social order, combined with the irruption of the economic crisis triggered in the 1970s by the rise in oil prices, created the opportunity for the recognition of a current of thought, monetarism, more often known from the 1980s as neoliberalism. In reaction against the Declaration of Philadelphia, the consensus in Washington in 1989 advocated remedies to the crisis such as fiscal equilibrium (tax reform, reduction of public expenditure and subsidies, liberalization of external exchanges of goods and capital, privatization, deregulation, transparency of decision-making bodies, counter-inflation measures). Hayek endeavours to

identify the means capable of protecting society from the danger of what he calls unlimited democracy. He situates himself in a tradition that advocates a system based on the uniformization of behaviours around the principle of personal interest. But he adds a new clause: the need to dissociate democratic institutions from the formation of the popular will, whose unlimited sovereignty he contests. He evacuates all teleological dimensions from state action in favour of a 'self-generated' order, but he also eliminates all teleological dimensions from collective and individual action.

So, it would be wrong to suppose that only the action of the state is in question. In fact, all voluntary human actions and especially those stemming from the deliberately promoted organization of units of collective interest, i.e. first and foremost groupings, associations, trade unions in all occupational sectors, are suspected of paralyzing the play of the spontaneous forces of the market. The weakening of sovereignty comes, for Hayek, both from the challenging of public authority which is regarded as unlimited in modern democracies, and also from the collective action of organized groups, which has gained an artificial preponderance over the forces of the market. Hayek understood very well that public action feeds on the collective actions of organized groups whose moral influence has powerful effects in terms of demands for social justice. Workers' associations are the first targets. Hayek seeks therefore to confine associations to a functional role as a depoliticized 'independent third sector' between the private and the public which is capable of providing many services more effectively than the state.

Hayek talks about institutions but seeks to assimilate them to organizations. In fact, he eliminates the institutional dimension, that of legitimacy and meaning. He judges private, public and third-sector entities only in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. This homogenization advocated by Hayek was echoed by governments in the 1980s, when the strength of social movements led some elites to fear an "excess of democracy" (Crozier, Huntington, Watanuki, 1975). The spectra of an ungovernable society incited the authorities to endorse Hayek's suggestions. But it may be wondered, on a world scale, whether the period is not characterized by the loss of credibility of neoliberalism, the pursuit of spontaneous order having led to generalized disorder. The social movements of the 1960s have fragmented but the questions they raised remain open and other democratic dynamics have reasserted themselves. As Ogien and Laugier say in their survey on the new forms of politics, an effervescence has broken out: "demonstrations and occupations, protest movements against the authorities, civil insurrections, transnational mobilizations, cyberactivism, creation of new parties, calls to disobedience.... This global wave of political protest started to roll in January 2011 in Tunisia, then swept through Cairo, moving on to Madrid, Athens, New York, London, Moscow, Quebec, San'aa, Tel Aviv, Dakar, Paris, Istanbul, Rio de Janeiro, Kiev, Caracas, Bangkok and Phnom Penh" (Ogien, Laugier, 2014, p. 7).

Taking into account these reactions in different continents at the beginning of the 21st century emerged what can be called a second wave of neoliberalism in which competition is completed by an explicit social aim. Echoing what happened in the 19th century, the personal interest motive has to be mixed with moralization of the poor to use Thompson's expression (Thompson, 1966). The new tendency is the extension of capitalism along philanthropic lines. Contemporary capitalism is less dependent on the mediation of goods to accumulate capital and more sensitive to the capacity for permanent innovation unfolding within itself. The accumulation of capital deeply depends on the accumulation of knowledge. This new regime, which followed the so-called Fordist model of the post-war boom, was said to be patrimonial or shareholder based, and was linked to numerous innovations in work (just-in-time, reengineering, total quality management), financial products (derivatives, employee saving plans, pension funds) and trade (internet, online-retaining). For example, Yunus (Yunus, 2007, p. 48 - 74) - key proponent of micro-credit - argue that that capitalism is a half-developed structure and can worthily be complemented by an 'enterprise oriented to a cause rather than to profit'. A "flood of creativity ... able to change the world" (Yunus, 2010), is expected from this innovating entrepreneurship,

referred to as 'social business'. The social entrepreneur is then considered as particular type of actor, playing a role of catalyst in social change – a change agent – putting forward innovating ideas to tackle social and environmental problems. Such philanthropic capitalism is also supported by donor investors concerned about the impacts of their donations; this is "venture philanthropy", a modernized philanthropy mindful of the evaluation of the social results of its financial contributions. This venture philanthropy is used as a way to relegitimate capitalism. It goes with the idea that innovation should be cultivated to create economic value and entrepreneurialism, and growth should be boosted to solve the related social and environmental problems. Prahalad (Pralhad, 2014) agreed with this when he put forward the bottom of the pyramid (or *bop*) approach, whereby the poorest populations – the four billion of people living with less than two dollars a day – are engaged either as producers and suppliers in value chains or consumers of products and services. This requires that the enterprise changes its perception of these people's needs so as to meet these needs; this approach, according to its proponents, is a powerful lever, which can be observed in several success stories.

From this point of view, multidimensional innovation helps to reconcile capitalism and society, through corporate responsibility; i.e. the social business and the bottom of the pyramid make up a system congruent with corporate social responsibility. The new spirit of capitalism combines a humanist societal discourse with renewed competitiveness, both being correlated to a high level of social innovation. At the historic moment when structural adjustment plans implemented in the South are set to spread to the North, the aim is to claim the potential of self-regulation and self-correction contained in the market relationship and in entrepreneurial action.

Whereas in democratic solidarity civil society was taken into account through its public space dimension, in the philanthropic solidarity approach, civil society occupies the space of private free initiative according to a liberal tradition. This second version considers the market as an economic expression of civil society and alerts to the risks inherent in public interference. This praise of civil society defined as defense against public intrusion is shown in the recommendations of international financial organizations about good governance. At the national level, to cite only one example, the English project of "Social Impact Bond" finds its place in the "Big Society" highlighted by a government advocating proximity solutions provided by civil society as alternatives to state intervention. Born in the 1970s, this school of thought opposes public bureaucracy and the independent private sector, which includes both enterprises and non-profit organizations. Socially-oriented private initiatives are expected to work together and cohere, as the social-business, venture-philanthropy and bottom of the pyramid models propose. However, this resembles the narrow conception of philanthropic solidarity referred to earlier in this chapter, which defined the social question in terms of the fight against poverty and assumed that voluntary social action was key for improving the fate of the poorest. In a nutshell, it prefers individual engagement and ethical awareness over norms emanating from public authorities and political questions.

3. Reinventing the democratic solidarity

The revolts of the 2010 years have made a major shift. The social movements are no more "new social movements". They deeply mix economic, social, political and cultural claiming, combined with a strong ethical dimension". Against the instrumentalization of ethics by neocapitalism, some civil society actors defend stakes about daily problems at the local level. They create spaces of experiences where they engage to a self-transformation and a collective way of living. By doing so, they contribute to "a renewal of solidarity, collective action and democracy". To be understood, these hybridizations of practices need a theoretical hybridization in at least two ways.

First, a reorientation in critical theory is needed. Passing from the first Frankfurt school, exemplified by the works from Adorno and Horkheimer dedicated to domination and reproduction, to the second Frankfurt school inaugurated by Habermas and more oriented to

examine the tensions between democracy and capitalism, was an important moment. The habermassian concept of public space was later modified when confronted to the 19th century history, it has to evolve with the diversity of citizens' initiatives in the beginning of the 21st century. A new approach of public action is relevant.

Second, a reorientation in economic heterodoxy and economic sociology is also needed. Both have insisted on the social construction of markets to oppose the naturalization of the market inherent to economic orthodoxy. But the embeddedness in Granovetter terms, as he recognizes it (Granovetter, 1985), does not allow to apprehend eco-diversity, as so necessary for democracy as for bio-diversity. Only the embeddedness in Polanyi terms allows to think the plurality of economic principles. Institutional processes concern markets but also different forms of redistribution, reciprocity and householding. Through these principles, there is a bridge between political and economic spheres, going beyond the borders built by Habermas between these two spheres. Symmetrically, economic behavior is no more guided by rational action and it becomes possible to link economic action and political choice, going from liberalism to deliberalism (Dacheux, Goujon, 2005).

Both arguments about hybridization summarize some of the challenges for reinventing a democratic solidarity bringing protection and emancipation. In this perspective, the dangerous liaison between social movements and corporate globalization is avoided and replaced by a new alliance between public institutions and civil society against the immoderate capital. The dangerous dependence of solidarity in the growth of national market production inherent to social democratic regimes is due to the fact that only redistribution is taken into account. The use of complex articulations between redistribution, reciprocity and householding provides a potential substitute. Every principle has its opportunities and risks and that is the reason why a deliberation is indispensable to find an appropriate balance. Of course, the economy beyond the market and the solidarity beyond the state are not easy to implement as the 21st century demonstrates. But anyway, such a horizon deeply differentiates from authoritarian models and from the confusion between democratic and philanthropic solidarity.

A renewal of public action

The concept of public space elaborated by Habermas (1991) in his book about public space provides a sharp criticism of voluntary associations: "The public sphere has become more an arena for advertising than a setting for rational-critical debate" (Calhoun, 1992, p. 26) and civil society organizations (CSOs), like political parties, "move people to offer their acclamation without providing political education or remedies for the "political immaturity" of voters" (*op. cit.* p.27). But in the new foreword written in 1990 Habermas takes a second position, reformulating the main question of the book as "the rediscovery of civil society" (Habermas, 1990). He acknowledges the necessary pluralization of the public space. One can then move from the identification of a plurality of public spaces to the study of the oppositions within them. A number of public spaces have been progressively dominated by the mass media and taken over by functional imperatives. The quality of democratic life is therefore dependent on the constitution of other, autonomous public spaces; hence the link with the associationism made up of collective actions implemented by free and equal citizens making reference to a common good. To break free from the rational action paradigm, it is necessary to mobilize this concept of voluntary association, which allows one to think of spontaneously emergent, domination-free relationships in noncontractualist terms (Habermas, 1989, p. 44). Habermas then converges with other authors such as Offe in emphasizing associative relationships and the prominent position of CSOs around which autonomous public spaces can crystallize, which justifies paying attention to voluntary association and associative life as a principal medium for the definition of public commitments (Habermas, 1992, p. 186). Why then does he hardly study these associative relationships which he considers essential for the future of democracy?

Habermas's valorization of associative relationships is somewhat lacking in precision. He privileges associations oriented towards demands, aiming to defend forms of solidarity and culture, such as regionalist, feminist or ecological movements. In the book edited by Calhoun, his "neglect of social movements" is indeed discussed especially by Eley and Fraser, who argue for a notion of multiple, sometimes overlapping or contending public spheres (Calhoun, 1992, p. 37). For Fraser (2015), the too sharp distinction that Habermas makes between associations in which opinions are formed and the public authorities who make decisions diverts him from an investigation of the complex relationship between civil society and the public authorities. This compartmentalization prevents analysis of the interdependences, which would presuppose a broader conception of public action, not limited to the activity of the public authorities but including all activity articulated with a public space and requiring reference to a common good. From this standpoint Ostrom's works provide material proving that CSOs are not limited to the formation of opinions and include decision-making in the framework of a situated action. Instead of isolating civil society from public authorities, the key challenge for the future is to envisage a reciprocal democratization of civil society and public authorities (Cohen, Arato, 1994). The democratic state can only regain legitimacy if it integrates possibilities for increased participation by salaried workers and users and if it is supported by forms of associative activity influenced by democratic solidarity. As for the state, it is responsible for facilitating voluntary commitment, which is an expression of this democratic solidarity. The social state promised a conception of solidarity focused on individual rights and redistribution. While it remains necessary, this conception is not sufficient. It also needs to encompass the promotion of common goods and social relations based on the respect of the principles of freedom and equality. This cross-fertilization of public action and civil society by a common reference to the democratic society has to be the main conduit for strengthening solidarity.

A paradigmatic change for the economy

To overcome Habermas illusion of selecting only associations that are neither economic nor linked to the state, the divide between production and advocacy is no more relevant. A new associationism can be considered if the diversity of citizens' initiatives is fully recognized, some insisting more on protests, other insisting more on services delivery but all mixing the two dimensions by a common pressure for institutional change. Keeping in mind the plural principals of economy identified by Polanyi, it becomes easier to envision the scope of what is possible in the economic activity of CSOs: they articulate these principles both in their project and in response to the constraints of the institutional frameworks. Thus, every association potentially draws its resources from the three poles of the economy: a market economy, through the sale of goods and services that produces competition; a non-market economy in which it receives contributions in the form of transfer revenues, and also private donations; a non-monetary economy based on the active support it receives through various forms of voluntary engagement, including mutual help networks and the involvement of the users. The economic equilibrium of every CSOs thus results from a hybridization of the three poles of the economy each requiring a specific study, manifesting a twofold movement. The institutionalist process of the economy in modern democracies has been characterized by the priority given to market exchange, even to the point of the economic fallacy of identifying the market with the economy (Polanyi, 1977, p. 5-17). But another, contradictory, movement has been made possible by the secularization of society: the invention of modern solidarity. By reviewing the forms this takes, it is possible to specify what Habermas refers to as the socially integrating force of solidarity mentioned by to counter the power of money and administrative power. But it supposes to break with the idea that the spheres of the economy and the state are related to the systems, and those of the public space and the family to lifeworlds. Given the unsustainability of such a separation, it is preferable to accept that the oppositions between systems and lifeworlds run through each sphere with varying intensity. The corollary is that there are not different categories of associations, some of which escape reification; rather, each association is torn between attempts at autonomization and a

tendency to isomorphic normalization.

Conclusion

For a long period, it has been difficult to envisage an alternative to the familiar understandings of capitalism as a naturally dominant form of economy (Gibson-Graham, 1996). However, the raise of philanthropy solidarity is mainly linked to the incompleteness of neo-liberalism system. Facing the critics of social movements, it is an attempt to address the claim for more solidarity by keeping unchanged the principles of neo-liberalism. If philanthropy venture is mainly embedded in Anglo-Saxon business world, it cannot be reduced to it. On the one hand, the concept has now an international influence. With the globalization of economic activities, the philanthropic solidarity model has expanded from North to South and modified in many places the previous vision of solidarity. On the other hand, even if democratic solidarity is mostly invisibilised, it keeps playing everywhere an important role for social innovation, even in North America. The main challenge is therefore to change our lenses on the question of solidarity in order to clarify the difference between democratic solidarity and philanthropic one. This distinction can be very helpful to enlarge our understanding of social enterprise. As shown in the further chapters, there is a great diversity of social enterprises in the world. Many of them are definitely participating of the resurgence of democratic solidarity. In order to better work for public action, they do it through collective entrepreneurship, reciprocity-based activity, and democratic governance (Laville, Young, Eynaud, 2016).

The objective of this book is thus to illustrate through cases studies coming from different countries how social enterprises can be engaged in plural institutions' world and grassroots participation. In this quest, anthropological, ethnographic and historical approaches have to be fostered and better mobilized. They can help us to better understand the limit of the main concepts we use and to understand their performativity. The plural reality of the economy can pave the way for a democratization process in contemporary societies. In order to move in such a direction, democratic solidarity is essential. It starts, as Mauss (1954) insisted, with recognizing that this solidarity rests on a particular relationship between reciprocity and redistribution, between the voluntary collective actions of equal citizens and the state's attempts to redress inequalities. The institutional base of the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) includes self-organization in civil society (unions, cooperatives, mutual insurance and non-profit organizations) and social protection by public rules. It is not a question of replacing reciprocal solidarity with redistributive solidarity, but of combining one with the other to renew the conception of social change.

As mentioned above, the pioneering associationism combined economic, political and cultural objectives. All these aims went separated with specialized institutions: parties dedicated to politics, trade-unions for collective workers' defense, social economy organizations (cooperatives, associations, mutual societies) for production or advocacy. During most of the 20th century, while social economy had some economic weight, it had no real political strength. As described above, the social innovations of the last part of the 20th century were categorized in Europe and South America under the term of "solidarity economy". The latter shares commonalities with the social economy but it revives a more political dimension, and it can be defined as a set of activities contributing to democratize the economy through citizens' involvement. According to Lipietz (Lipietz, 2001), the solidarity economy adds to the social economy – which focuses on the internal functioning – an awareness of the importance of the goals pursued (from environmental to cultural goals) and a necessity to complement formal equality among members with modes of direct participation. The tradition of social economy and the resurgence of associative democracy in the late 20th century generates a new perspective: the social and solidarity economy (SSE). To a certain extent, social movements can no more ignore their socio-economic functioning (Coraggio, 2016) as well as social and solidarity economy is only relevant if it resources economism and call upon the dominant system in close connection

with other movements (Fraser, 2015, p. 258).

The 20th century left us with two extreme cases that we should avoid in the future: the subordination of economy to a political will whose egalitarianism was a mask for coercion, on the one hand, and a market society whose inequality was justified by an appeal for individual freedom, on the other hand. The contemporary challenge is to find new ways of guaranteeing a plural economy within a framework of democracy. Methodologically as this contribution tries to highlight, a future for democratic solidarity requires both a new lecture of its history and precise review of its different modes, in the South and in the North, for a global dialogue.

References

Blin, A. (2017). Politicizing the enterprise: The history of cooperatives in Wisconsin (years 1870-1930). PhD for the grade of Dr in History and Civilizations, EHESS, Paris, November the 18th.

Braudel, F. (1985). *La dynamique du capitalisme*. Paris, Arthaud
Brooks-Higginbotham, E., 1990, *Righteous Discontent. The Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880 - 1920*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Bry, F. de (2006). Du paternalisme à la responsabilité sociale. In J-P. Galavielle, A. Salmon (dir.), "Éthique, économie et société : une affaire de politique? ", *European Journal of Economic and Social Systems*, vol. 19, n°1.

Calhoun, C. (1992). *Habermas and the public sphere*. Cambridge, MIT Press.

Castoriadis, C. (1975). *L'institution imaginaire de la société*. Paris, Le Seuil.

Castells, M., Caraça, J. and Cardoso, G. (2012). *Aftermath: the culture of economic crisis*. Oxford University press, 315 pages.

Chevassus-Au-Louis, N. (2006). *Les briseurs de machine : De Ned Ludd à Jose Bové*. Paris, Seuil.

Clemens, E.S. (1993). Organizational repertoires and institutional changes: women's groups and the transformation of US politics, 1890 – 1920. *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 98.

Cohen, J.L. and Arato, A. (1994). *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MIT Press
Coraggio, J.L., (org.), 2016, *Economía social y solidaria en movimiento*, Buenos Aires, Los Polvines, Ediciones Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento.

Coraggio, J.L. et al. (2016). The theory of social enterprise and pluralism", in J.L. Laville, D. Young, P. Eynaud, *Civil Society, the Third Sector and Social Enterprise*, London and New-York, Routledge.

Crozier, M., Huntington, S. and Watanuki, J. (1975). *The Crisis of democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, New-York, New-York University Press.

Dacheux, E. and Goujon, D. (2015). La délibération, une clef pour penser autrement l'économie : l'exemple de l'économie solidaire. *Essaches*, vol. 8, n°2(16).

Duprat, C. (1993). *Pour l'amour de l'humanité : le temps des philanthropes. La philanthropie parisienne des Lumières à la monarchie de juillet*. Paris, Éd. du Comité des travaux historiques et

scientifiques, t. I.

Eisenstein, H. (2005). A Dangerous Liaison? Feminism and Corporate Globalization. *Science and Society*, n° 3.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Harvard, Harvard University Press.

Evans, S. (1980). *Personal Politics. The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movements and the New Left*. New-York, Vintage Books.

Faure, A. and Rancière, J. (2007). *La Parole ouvrière* (1976). Paris, La Fabrique.

Fraser, N. (1997). *Rethinking the public sphere. A contribution to the critic of actually existing democracy in justice interrupts. Critical reflexion on the post "socialist" condition*. New-York, London, Routledge.

Fraser, N. (2009). Feminism, capitalism and history trick. *New Left Review*, n° 56.

Fraser, N. (2015). Entretien avec Hersent, M., Laville, J-L., Saussey, M.. *Revue française de socio-économie*, premier semestre, n°15
Granovetter, M., 2008, "Introduction pour le lecteur français", in *Sociologie économique*, Paris, Le Seuil.

Gibson-Graham, J. K. (1996). *The end of capitalism (as we knew it): a feminist critique of political economy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Granovetter, M. (1985). "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness". *American Journal of Sociology*. 91 (3): pp. 481–510.

Habermas, J. (1990). Vorwort zur Neuauflage 1990. In *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (1989). La souveraineté populaire comme procédure. Un concept normatif d'espace public, *Lignes*, N°7, septembre.

Habermas, J. (1991). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought) Sixth Printing Edition*. The MIT Press, Sixth Printing edition, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (1962).

Habermas, J. (1992). L'espace public, trente ans après. *Quaderni*, n° 18, automne
Habermas, J., 1997, *Droit et démocratie*, Paris, Gallimard.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1962). *The age of revolution: 1789-1848*. Vintage books, New York.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1975). *The age of capital 1848-1875*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1987). *The age of empire capital 1875-1914*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (2005). *L'ère des révolutions, 1789-1848*, Paris. Hachette Littératures.

Lipietz, A. (2001). *Pour le tiers secteur*. Paris, La Découverte.

Laville J.L., Young D. and Eynaud P. (2016). *Civil society, The Third Sector, Social Enterprise*:

- Governance and Democracy, Routledge Publisher, Oxfordshire, April, paperback.
- Lutz, B. (1990). *Le mirage de la croissance marchande*. Paris, Maison des sciences de l'homme.
- Mariategui, JC. (1979). *Ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana*. Caracas, Biblioteca Ayacucho.
- Mauss, M. (1954). *The Gift*. London, Cohen and West.
- Mauss, M. (1997). *Ecrits politique.*, textes réunis et présentés par M. Fournier, Paris, Fayard.
- Mauss, M. (2001). *Sociologie et Anthropologie*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Mc Carthy, K.D. (2003). *American creed*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
- Mingione, E. (1991). *Fragmented Societies. A Sociology of Economic Life beyond the Market Paradigm*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
- Nyssens, M. (1994). *Quatre essais sur l'économie populaire urbaine. Le cas de Santiago du Chili*, Louvain-la-Neuve, Université catholique de Louvain, faculté des sciences économiques, sociales et politiques, nouvelle série, n° 231.
- Ogien, R. and Laugier, S. (2014). *Le principe démocratique*. Paris, La Découverte.
- Pecqueur, C. (1839). *Economie sociale. Des intérêts du commerce, de l'industrie et de l'agriculture et de la civilisation en général sous l'influence des implications de la vapeur : machines fixes, chemins de fer, bateaux à vapeur, etc, ..., Paris, Dessart, 2 vol.*
- Petitclerc, J.M. (2007). *Nous protégeons l'infortune. Les origines populaires de l'économie sociale au Québec*, Montréal, VLB.
- Pleyers, G. and Capitaine, B. (dir.). (2016). *Mouvements sociaux. Quand le sujet devient acteur*, Paris, Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
- Pleyers, G. (2010). *Alter-globalization: becoming actors in the global age*, Polity, 315 pages.
- Polanyi, K. (1977). The economic fallacy. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, Vol. 1, No. 1.
- Polanyi, K., 1977, *The Livelihood of Man*, New York, New York Academic Press.
- Prahalad, C.K. (2004). *Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits*. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Wharton School Publishing.
- Quijano, A. (1998). *Modernidad, identidad y utopia en America Latina*. Lima, Sociedad y politica ediciones.
- Quijano, A. (2007). Sistemas alternativos de produccion. In JL. Coraggio, (dir.), *La economia social desde la periferia. Constituciones latinoamericanas*, Buenos Aires, Altamira.
- Ryan, M.P. (1992). Gender and public access: women's politics in the 19th century America. In C. Calhoun, *Habermas and the public sphere*, Cambridge, MIT.
- Santana Junior, G. (2005). *A economia solidaria face a dinamica da acumulacao capitalista. Da subordinacao a un novo modo de regulacao social*, thesis for social sciences doctorate, Bahia,

Universidad federal da Bahia.

Sarria Icaza, A.M. and Tiriba, L. (2006). *Économie populaire*. In J.-L. Laville, A.D. Cattani, *Dictionnaire de l'autre économie*, Paris, Gallimard.

Scott, J.C. (1976). *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. New-Haven, London, Yale University Press.

Servet, J-M. (2006). *Banquiers aux pieds nus. La microfinance*. Paris, Odile Jacob.

Sewell, W H. (1980). *Work and revolution in France: the language of labor from the Old Regime to 1848*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Thelwall, J. (1796). *The Rights of Nature, London - Norwich*, H.D Symonds & J. March Thompson, E.P., 1963, *The Making of the English Working Class*, New-York, Vintage Books.

Thompson, E.P. (1966). *The Making of the English Working Class*. Vintage publisher.

Yunus, M. (2007). *Creating a World without Poverty, Social Business and the Future of Capitalism*. New York, Perseus Books.

Yunus, M. (2010). *Building Social Business. The New Kind of Capitalism that Serves Humanity's most Pressing Needs*, New-York, Public Affairs.